JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Interviewees also noted the risks and negative aspects of taking equity besides those associated with low or zero economic payoff. On many campuses, the decision to take equity occurred only after considerable debate about the propriety of extending the university involvement in the commercialization of academic knowledge into holding direct ownership stakes in firms. Some critics saw equity holdings as increasing the risk that the university might be held liable or suffer from adverse publicity for product defects. The claimed benefit of improved alignment with the interests of a firm was also seen as lending credence to charges that the university was losing sight of its traditional role as a generator of knowledge as a public good and as an independent societal source of expertise on complex scientific and technical issues. The following discussion of the relative attractiveness of equity and licensing as compensation mechanisms abstracts from these considerations.
Cataloguing the pros and cons of alternative mechanisms, however, is essentially a static task. Technology transfer officials expressed many of these same assessments about the relative attractiveness of equity and licensing in the mid-1980s (Feller 1990 ). Few, however, entered into equity arrangements at that time. Drawing on data from a survey of Carnegie I and II research universities, we offer a set of findings about the spread of equity holdings among universities and the patterns that exist among universities in their willingness to use the equity mechanism. The conceptual model we develop treats the move to equity as an adaptation to the problems and inadequacies of traditional licensing agreements. Our inquiry is cast in terms of a model of institutional change and adaptation conditioned by learning and the diffusion of best practices, and organizational incentives and behavior.
Why Equity Has Emerged As a Technology Transfer Mechanism
The provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act established universities' property rights over federally funded inventions and encouraged universities to actively promote the transfer of those inventions to commercial use. The initial university response was to create technology transfer offices to secure intellectual property rights through patents, and endeavor to sell rights to use those patents to firms. Three patterns have emerged. First, the number of patents received by universities increased to the point where 3,151 patents-5%, of the U.S. total patents in 1998-were granted to universities. Second, the number of universities 
Licensing Reconsidered
Licensing agreements typically involve selling a company the rights to use a university's inventions in return for revenue in the form of upfront fees at the time of closing the deal, and annual, ongoing royalty payments that are contingent upon the commercial success of the technology in a downstream market. The terms of the licensing agreement depend upon the assessment of the value of the technology in a product market that is often uncertain and thus difficult to evaluate. While there are some standards, many provisions of the royalty agreement are negotiated. Bray and Lee (2000) report that license issue fees typically range from $10,000 to $50,000 but may be as high as $250,000, while royalty rates are typically 2% to 5% but may be as high as 15%. 
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is based on the total assets of the firm, which is expected to be greater than the return to any individual product. Second, TTOs, as well as firms, have begun to appreciate the mutual benefits of equity in aligning university-firm interests. Third, interviewees believe that equity more so than licensing provides prestige and legitimacy for both the university and the firm. We discuss these arguments within the context of pertinent theoretical frameworks in the sections below.
The Upside Revenue Potential of Equity
In discussing the advantages of equity-based licenses, many of our respondents cited the upside potential of this transfer mechanism. Through equity, the university has the opportunity to benefit from future products or processes that increase the technical and economic value of the firm. This view of equity is not new; however, for several reasons the perceived value of equity has increased over the past 10 years compared to the value ascribed to traditional licensing. First, as discussed, many universities have been disappointed by the revenue-generating performance of their traditional licenses. Not only have relatively fewer inventions resulted in licenses than had been hoped, but also the majority of these licenses have provided only moderate, if any, returns. The opportunity cost of taking an equity option is the forgone revenues that the university could receive had it negotiated a traditional license with upfront fees, milestone payments, and running royalties. Given that universities have learned from their own experiences and the experiences of other universities that this opportunity cost is, on average, relatively low, the decision to trade traditional licensing revenues for equity holdings has become more attractive. Second, many respondents noted that equity has the advantage in providing the university with an opportunity to share in the fortunes of a firm rather than just in the fortunes of a technology that may have contributed to the development of the firm but did not directly result in a commercial product. While traditional licensing agreements are specific to the use of a particular patent, equity deals provide a means for the university to share in the company's success even in the event that no licensing royalties accrue to the original technology. The technology covered by university patents and licenses are typically far away from the commercial market and may not result in a viable commercial product. However, a firm's experience with the licensed technology may provide knowledge that is incorporated into subsequent products and materially contribute to the company's ultimate commercial success. Equity deals permit the university to capture at least some of the returns associated with such knowledge transfer. In the worst-case scenario-where the original technology proves to be completely worthless-the university still can benefit from an equity deal if the selected partner proves viable. Equity holdings yield a portfolio that captures a broad range of potential futures. In this respect, equity has come to be perceived as being less risky than traditional licenses.
Third, there is a broader recognition that holding an equity position permits the university to buy time, waiting to exercise its option (i.e., sell its equity) until uncertainty about the economic value of its patent holdings is reduced (Vonortas and Hertzfeld, 1998). Again, academic patents typically are early-stage technological developments characterized by high degrees of technical and market uncertainty. To bring the technology under an academic patent to market often requires considerable follow-on research, as well as additional costs for approval (in the case of drugs), production, and distribution. With a traditional license, the university has little option but to negotiate the upfront fees, milestone payments, and fixed royalty rates in the shadow of this uncertainty. To deal with such uncertainty, the universities tend to adopt standard industry-specific running royalty rates, or to rely on technology licensing officials with expertise in selected technological fields. The first technique drives the institution's negotiating position to the average rate of return for licenses in a field, while the latter entails additional administrative costs. In fact, the latter is feasible only for those institutions with sizeable numbers of patents, clustered into discernible utility or industry classes. Employment of either of these techniques effectively reduces overall licensing returns. In comparison, equity deals look relatively more attractive. If the company has an Initial Public Offering or is acquired before achieving Finally, it must be noted that for most of the 1990s-the period when university equity holding increased-the performance of the stock market, and of technology stocks in particular, had been quite positive.12 University personnel, evaluating the potential of equity against this backdrop, were likely to perceive the returns of equity to be quite promising.
The Incentive Alignment Value of Equity Another recurring theme that emerged from our discussions with technology-transfer officers was the view that equity more so than licensing was a means to align the interests of the university and the licensing firm. Three aspects of alignment were stressed: (1) common goals related to the appreciation of the value of the firm and the commercialization of the technology; (2) relative ease of initial contractual negotiations; and (3) provision for ongoing, within agreement, decision-making and adjustment. Each of these is discussed in turn.
Several technology transfer officers emphasized the benefits provided by equity-based licenses by aligning the long-term interests of the firm and the university. With equity, both parties gain as the total value of the licensed technology, as well as the firm as a whole, increases. As such, it is in the best interests of both parties to take actions that enhance the probability of the firm's commercial success. TTO officials view this goal alignment as smoothing existing and future university-firm technology transfer transactions. As noted by one respondent, a firm that has executed an equity-based license can expect to find the going much easier in subsequent negotiations to sponsor research with, or acquire additional technology rights from, the university. Rather than play hardball in hopes of structuring the best possible one-time, stand-alone deal, the university-evaluating the new deal in light of its existing ties-is more likely to strive to expedite the transaction in a manner that enhances firm viability. Our interviewees suggest that it is easier to agree on the latter than the former.13 Specifically, equity agreements are easier to write as they center on the delineation of property rights and do not involve the specification of the large number of contingency terms that a traditional license does. Equity also is reported to have an advantage over traditional licensing in that it reduces the potential for litigation relating to the firm's use of the licensed technology. Consider a case in which a firm draws upon a university license in its evolving efforts to develop a commercially viable product, all the while modifying, scrapping, and extending elements of the technology. Each modification opens up new potential for legal conflicts about the extent to which the final product makes use of the licensed technology. As the original contract rarely completely (or even significantly) anticipates these developments, there are seldom payment and/or performance terms on point. To resolve disputes, the university and firm may attempt to renegotiate in good faith. However, such renegotiations, given the zero-sum nature of royalty payments, may be contentious, break down, and lead to litigation. In an equity deal, contribution disputes are less likely to produce this outcome as both players share in all value created. 13Though prior to taking a first equity deal, there is often contentious debates at the university about the proper role of the university and the general framework for all future equity deals, these deliberations generally come before the university sits down to negotiate with an individual firm. Interviewees tell us those subsequent firm-university negotiations, given the focused nature of the negotiation on a particular deal, is generally straightforward. signal to capital markets and potential strategic partners that the university has made a positive evaluation of the worthiness of the technology and the firm's development competencies. If this signal is perceived as valuable, it may give the university some advantage in the equity share negotiations and thus enhance its returns.
Perhaps more salient for our goal of understanding universities' use of the equity mechanism is the prestige value that technology transfer personnel believe that having active licenses conveys to the university. The university's willingness to take equity lowers the cost of licensing the technology and this may generate more licensing activity. We therefore might expect that universities with low levels of licensing activity, both in absolute and relative terms, to adopt taking equity as a means to increase their measured level of technology transfer activity. Further, there is also a perceived halo effect of university equity positions. Universities with a high number of equity deals generally gain an affirmative reputation for being progressive and entrepreneurial.
In conclusion, equity appears to provide an improved mechanism for university technology transfer. Although equity options are not without problems, our interviews reveal that university officials find that equity offers some advantages over traditional licensing agreements based on up-front fees and royalty payments. The next section develops a set of hypotheses that relate university characteristics to the adoption of equity and presents data that we will use to test these hypotheses. 
Hypotheses and Data
Direct Technology Transfer Office Attributes:
Experience and Structure One strong association that emerged from our interviews was that of the relationship between technology-transfer experience and the perceived attractiveness of equity as a technology transfer mechanism. In general, we observed that experience with traditional licensing give rise to dissatisfaction with this technique and subsequent experimentation with new mechanisms. Hands-on experience seemed to expose previously unconsidered limits of traditional licensing. As TTOs gained experience with traditional licensing mechanisms, they appear to also become more skeptical about the expected returns accruing to this transfer mechanism. This greater understanding of potential limits led to a downward revision of the transfer mechanism's relative attractiveness, which, in turn, appears to create a willingness to experiment with alternative transfer mechanisms, such as equity-based licenses. In addition, universities that have more experience with industry-sponsored research are expected to have a greater commitment to technology transfer and to be more willing to experiment with new mechanisms that appear to offer perceived benefits. As TTOs gain experience with industry through sponsored research they appear to be more willing to attempt to facilitate increased interaction in technology transfer. Thus, the following hypothesis. HYPOTHESIS 3. Leading performers, those performing substantially above the benchmarked target, will be more likely than average pwformers to adopt equity-based transfer mechanisms.
For decision-makers who have not been successful to date-those performing substantially below target levels-the desire to reach the target will cause them to focus on opportunities associated with the risky action (March and Shapira 1987). Any action that may get them closer to the target is attractive. Because, these managers are currently doing poorly, they do not have much to lose if the gamble fails to play out to their advantage. Thus, these individuals are expected to have a predilection for risk-prone behavior: HYPOTHESIS 4. Lagging universities, performing substantially below their cohorts, will be more likely than average performers to adopt equity-based technology transfer mechanisms.
Description of Survey Data
The most cited source on university technology transfer, the AUTM annual survey, first reported data on university equity agreements in 1995. Over the course of the survey's history, however, AUTM has changed data collection items, adding and dropping variables in response to changes in university practices. The changes limit the usefulness of these surveys to discern trends. As a result, researchers interested in more focused questions have used mail and telephone surveys to collect original data on the equity aspects of university technology transfer activities. Bray This classification system will be undergoing major changes in the near future. Only one institution, Howard University, did not have an office of technology transfer or some individual whom we were able to identify as being assigned technology transfer as their primary responsibility. the independent variables from sources other than our survey necessitated omitting five institutions from our econometric estimation. Again, we do not find evidence that the estimation sample is biased with respect to any measurable characteristics.
In describing the characteristics of our respondents, we draw upon the full sample of 67. Of the TTO respondents, 76% indicated that their university had taken equity in a company. Our findings are similar to those from Thursby et al. (2001), who found that 82% of their 62 responding universities had taken equity as part of a licensing deal. The similar number of respondents is a coincidence, as the sampling frame of our respondents differ. The lower rate of universities taking of equity in our sample may be a result of the greater institutional diversity in our sample frame.
Thirteen universities (19% of our respondents), each a public university, were prohibited from taking equity in companies because of state statutes that limit their range of activity. These legislative restrictions do not limit the universities' initiatives to be in a legal position to accept equity, however. Of these universities, 10 formed independent 501(c)3 entities to manage their intellectual property and to take equity holdings.16 To date, seven of these entities have taken equity in lieu of licensing fees for a university invention. Three of the independent entities had not taken equity at the time of our interview.
University officials were asked the total number of equity deals in which they had participated. Our respondent set of 67 universities participated in 679 equity deals. The distribution of the number of deals is highly skewed as shown in Figure 2 interests divided by the number of active university licenses in 1998. The equity share of active university licenses is thus a fraction that is truncated at zero and bounded by one at the upper level. There are ten cases for which the number of equity deals was zero, which is the lower bound for our data. We therefore use the lower-bound TOBIT model and the number of 1998 licensing agreement is used as an analytic weight in the model to pt-wide robust estimation (Maddala 1983 Model 3 estimates the university's intensity of use of equity relative to the technology-transfer performance of peer institutions. The experience of the technology-transfer office relative to other institutions is measured as a dummy variable that is equal to one if the university respectively lags or leads other universities in its cohort in terms of average annual licensing. We find that those universities that lag their cohort make greater use of equity after accounting for structural characteristics. The coefficient for universities that lead their cohorts is of the expected sign but is not statistically significant. This finding suggests that universities that are average relative to their cohort make less use of equity, confirming Hypothesis 3. The coefficient for institutions that lead their cohort. Hypothesis 4, was of the expected sign but not statistically significant.
Our specifications also include structural characteristics and the results suggest universities make greater use of equity deals in technology transfer if they have a medical school. In addition, Carnegie II research universities appear to make greater use of equity. Model 3 reveals that public universities appear to make greater use of equity when they compare themselves to their cohorts.
In sum, the results support the expectation that universities both learn from their own experience and from the experiences of others. We also find that structural characteristics of the university affect the degree to which the university is able and willing to experiment with equity. Notably, universities with medical schools made greater use of equity in licensing agreements. Carnegie II research universities also seemed to be more aggressive in adopting the new mechanism. This fact seems to bear on the relative standing of these institutions and their desire to advance their position.
Conclusions
Recent trends towards increased university acceptance of equity as compensation for intellectual property rights represents a new strategic perspective on intellectual property management and technology transfer. The older, established view for universities accepting equity in lieu of licensing fees was that equity was the only compensation being offered by cash-starved start-up firms who were the only party that would be interested in the university's patents. We find that equity is increasingly seen by university technology licensing offices as an attractive mechanism that offers advantages in both increasing the upside revenue potential of university technology and improving the alignment between the institution's interests and those of the firm. The adoption of equity may be seem as part of a trend in which universities are becoming more entrepreneurial in light of new opportunities and changing expectations.
These theoretical considerations point to the importance of institutional learning-the product of a university's own experiences and that of other similar institutions, the characteristics of the technology transfer office, and a set of structural variableswhich all affect the degree to which an institution accepts equity as a mechanism in its intellectual property licensing transactions. In this paper, we have developed and tested four hypotheses about the effect of direct experience, organizational incentives, and experience relative to a related cohort on the adoption MANAGEMENT SCIENCE/Vol. 48, No. 1, January 2002 of a new technology transfer mechanism. Our initial results at testing these relationships, using data from a national survey of Carnegie I and II research universities and other measures of academic licensing, support this interpretation.
Our results, though, are limited by both sample size and the absence of attention to changes over time and in university policy. In particular, the recent sharp decline in high-tech stock prices and in IPO share prices may reduce the allure of the equity option. In effect, our view of future trends in university holdings of equity is agnostic. Experience cuts both ways. In many respects, given the recent attention (and hyperbole) associated with university equity initiatives, we would expect the trend to continue, indeed to accelerate. All of our respondents indicated that they expected their university's use of equity would increase or stay the same in the next year. Universities are constantly adapting and learning and our results, and those of other researchers, may relate primarily to the pre-inflexion stage of adoption and diffusion. On the other hand, any prolonged decline in stock prices may quickly lead many technologytransfer offices back into the safe harbor of traditional licensing arrangements. Asking which route may be followed is akin to asking whether it is more profitable in today's market to buy long or sell short. Only time will tell.
